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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) has become increas-
ingly popular in people’s daily lives. The pervasive IoT devices
are encouraged to share data with each other in order to better
serve the users. However, users are reluctant to share sensitive
data due to privacy concerns. In this paper, we study the
anonymous data aggregation for the IoT system, in which the
IoT company servers, though not fully trustworthy, are used to
assist the aggregation. We propose an efficient and accountable
aggregation scheme that can preserve the data anonymity. We
analyze the communication and computation overheads of the
proposed scheme, and evaluate the total execution time and the
per-user communication overhead with extensive simulations.
The results show that our scheme is more efficient than the
previous peer-shuffle protocol, especially for data aggregation
from multiple providers.
Keywords—Data aggregation; anonymous; accountable; IoT
I. INTRODUCTION
Data aggregation is a common task in modern computing
systems, such as crowd-sourcing, sensor networks, and cloud
computing. However, users are concerned with the privacy of
sensitive data, such as medical records, or data that is geo-
temporal tagged. To motivate the user’s active involvement,
many anonymous data aggregation schemes have been pro-
posed to preserve data privacy. Threats that may expose the
data ownership include the untrusted aggregator, unsecured
channels and colluding adversarial participants. The receiver
of a packet, like the data collector or an intermediate processor,
is capable of tracing back to its immediate sender (e.g.,
via the source IP address). To preserve data anonymity, the
aggregation protocol must break the link between a piece of
data and its originator (not necessarily the immediate sender).
Existing anonymous data aggregation mechanisms are de-
signed for the traditional server-client architecture, in which a
set of users (clients) submit their data to the collector (server).
However, it is meaningless to discuss data anonymity for the
simple server-client data aggregation in IoT ecosystem. In IoT
scenario, each IoT company is viewed as the combination of
its central server, and a set of client devices deployed with
users. The client devices are the actual generators of data, and
provide data readings to their owners. However, client devices
are manufactured by the respective IoT companies, and users
do not have the control to prevent the data from being secretly
sent to the IoT company server in the background. Therefore,
instead of studying the anonymity of data aggregation from
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the IoT devices of an individual company, we focus on data
aggregation across multiple IoT companies. This problem can
be described using a server-clients-servers framework (shown
in Figure 1), in which multiple client IoT devices are deployed
within a home environment. One IoT company (collector
server) wants to collect a group of data produced by the client
devices of other IoT companies for aggregation studies. For
example, a smart home solution company may anonymously
collect and analyze the energy consumption and generation
data from the residents of a neighborhood, to devise better
planning for both energy suppliers and home owners. The
major difference to the traditional data aggregation is that the
collector requires the data from multiple provider servers to
be submitted as a group (tuple), while users need to prevent
an IoT server (either the collector server or a provider server)
from revealing the owner of the data which does not belong
to that IoT company.
In this paper, we study the anonymous data aggregation
across multiple providers in the IoT system. The adversaries
considered include compromised users, malicious IoT servers,
and a global passive eavesdropper. Two passive collusion
attacks and 12 active attacks are presented. We design a robust,
efficient and accountable aggregation scheme that is resistant
to all types of manipulations and collusions by the adversarial
entities. We analyze how our scheme can defeat these attacks
and provide the accountability, as well as its communication
and computation overheads. The performance is evaluated via
simulation tests, and is compared with the Dissent protocol
[6]. The results indicate that our scheme is more efficient when
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collecting data from multiple providers.
Our main contributions are listed as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
studies the anonymous data aggregation across multiple IoT
companies in the server-users-servers architecture of the
IoT system, which cannot be properly solved by existing
solutions that focus on the traditional server-users structure.
• Our aggregation scheme does not rely on any trusted
3rd-party server. Instead, it takes advantage of the semi-
trustworthy provider servers, considering an IoT company
will not leak the data produced by its own client devices to
other companies.
• We consider a more complex adversary model. Two ad-
vanced passive collusion attacks and twelve active attacks
specific to our scheme are presented.
• We analyze the communication and computation overheads,
and measure the execution time and the per-user communi-
cation overhead with extensive simulations.
II. RELATED WORK
The existing data aggregation schemes can be generally
classified into two categories: (1) the collector only knows
the originator of each encrypted message, but cannot directly
decrypt any of the individual messages. Instead, the plaintext
is derived through a collaborative computation over a set of
ciphertexts, in which the collector cannot figure out the actual
contributors of the plaintext data. (2) the collector receives
unencrypted messages that contain the plaintext data, but the
immediate sender of each message is not the originator. This
happens when the packets have been routed through a set of
relays or have been randomly shuffled.
The first class of methodologies include DC-nets [4] and
(t;N)-secret sharing based scheme [27]. DC-nets utilize pair-
wise secrets to conceal the originator of data. However, there
are two major problems in DC-nets: (i) only one member can
embed her data into the ciphertext per slot, while all other
members still have to perform the XOR operations (ii) pairwise
shared secret keys are required between every two members,
and the secrets have to be updated every slot. The generation
and distribution of the pairwise secrets can be a heavy burden,
especially when there is a large number of members. In [27],
one user can divide her secret s into N shares and submitted
by N users separately. However, only one user can submit per
slot while all others have to generate and share N shares of
fake data, which brings large communication overhead.
The second class of aggregation schemes consists of Mix-
Net [3], onion routing [21] [8], and peer-shuffle based ap-
proach [2]. Mix-Net offers anonymity by relaying encrypted
messages through a chain of proxy servers (mixes), which
take turns to perform decryption, shuffle, and re-ordering on
the messages. In onion networks, the encrypted message is
transmitted along a path of pre-selected onion routers, each
peels away one layer of encryption and uncovers the successor
router. However, both Mix-Net and early onion routing sys-
tems all require reliable and trustful 3rd-party proxies/routers,
which may not be available in practice. The evolved onion
routing based systems propose peer-forwarding strategy [22],
in which users themselves serve as the relay for each other.
However, the predecessor of the first colluder has a greater
chance to be the data originator than other honest users, and
this scheme is unable to defend against traffic analysis attacks
launched by a global eavesdropper. RAC protocol [19] solves
these issues by enforcing periodical broadcasts for all users,
which bring in huge communication overheads.
The peer-shuffle based approach [2] requires each member
to perform shuffle and one layer of decryption on the messages
that have been encrypted with all members’ public keys.
Dissent [6] enhances this protocol to offer accountability
against traffic analysis and compromised members. Then, in
order to reduce the heavy computation overheads, many of
the above schemes have been modified to be more scalable.
Two types of techniques are commonly used. The first type
is to gain better scalability while sacrificing anonymity (e.g.
reducing anonymity set) [14] [1]. The second type utilizes
trusted 3rd-party servers to offload the communication and
computation overheads [5], [7], [23]. Instead, our scheme
preserves the maximal anonymity, and does not utilize the
assistance of the trustworthy external 3rd-party servers.
A recent work [26] studies the anonymous data reporting
for participatory sensing in IoT. They adopt the peer-shuffle for
slot reservation and pairwise secret XOR for data submission.
They still consider data aggregation in the traditional single
server-clients structure, which as we have explained, is not
a practical issue in IoT system. They do not consider the
accountability for attacks and misbehaviors either.
Key management [9], [11], [25] is essential for security.
Several papers [10], [12], [15]–[18], [24] have studied related
security issues.
III. DATA AGGREGATION IN IOT
A. Motivation
Aggregate study is a typical application of anonymous data
aggregation. In IoT context, one IoT company may need to col-
lect the data of other IoT companies along with its own data,
from a certain group of users. By analyzing the patterns and
correlations of these data, e.g. using data mining techniques,
the collector company can gain better understanding of its data
and product. In general, an aggregate study is not a strict real-
time task, instead is conducted with a relatively high frequency
and over a long period of time. This means that the aggregation
can bear rather longer elapse caused by computations, but
require low communication overhead. Furthermore, since users
may not trust either the IoT company servers or a 3rd-party
server, the anonymity is achieved via user cooperations only.
The IoT provider servers may assist the data submission, but
only for improving efficiency. Hence, we adopt a modified
version of peer-shuffle technique in our scheme. The peer-
shuffle can provide anonymity for the messages/data of honest
users if no more than n − 2 out of the n users collude. In
fact, all sorts of anonymizations based on peer collaboration
will fail if n − 1 users are compromised, so we assume
at least two users are honest. Moreover, considering various
adversaries may try to break the data privacy or tamper the
data submission, the scheme must be accountable for attacks
and misbehaviors.
B. The System Model
Our system model consists of a set of IoT companies W =
{W0,W1, ...,Wm} and a set of users U = {U1, U2, ..., Un}.
An IoT company Wi includes a central server Si and a number
of affiliated client devices Aij (owned by user Uj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n).
We use S0 to denote the data collecting server (collector
server), and the rest of the servers S1, S2, ..., Sm are the
data providing servers (provider servers). All servers maintain
connections with the affiliated client devices. Each user Uj
is also connected to all IoT client devices in his/her home,
Aij(0 ≤ i ≤ m), through a management device (e.g. smart-
phone). The management device has access to the data gener-
ated by IoT devices, and will perform the heavy computations
for data anonymization. Without loss of generality, we assume
that every user owns exactly one client device from each IoT
company. The data reading Dij of device Aij is accessible
by both its owner Uj and the server Si. Additionally, data
generated by the same type of client devices (i.e., belonging to
the same IoT company) are of the same format and length. The
collector company W0 can aggregate data Dij from multiple
provider companies Wi(1 ≤ i ≤ m), if approved by the
data owners Uj . Figure 1 illustrates the many-to-one data
aggregation in the server-users-servers architecture.
Each IoT company Wi(0 ≤ i ≤ m) owns a pair of
public/private keys (KUSi ,KR
S
i ). Each user Uj(1 ≤ j ≤ n)
also possesses a public/private key pair (KUUj ,KR
U
j ). Given
a plaintext M and the public key KU , the encryption also
takes some random bits R as input. The produced ciphertext
is expressed as C = ERKU [M ]. The plaintext can be recovered
with the private key KR (R is not required), M = DKR[C].
The advantages of introducing random bits are two-fold: (1)
the same piece of plaintext can generate different ciphertexts,
so that the equality of data will not be exposed after encryp-
tion; (2) the recovery of encrypted data from the decrypted
data is disabled. Various probabilistic encryption methods can
achieve these characteristics, such as the Elgamal encryption
algorithm [13] and the plaintext expansion/padding. In peer-
shuffle process, the plaintext messages need to be encrypted
with all users’ public keys (i.e., serial encryptions). For the
Elgamal encryption algorithm, the ciphertext length may in-
crease exponentially to the total number of encryption rounds
N . In contrast, the padding approach can maintain a ciphertext
length of |M |+O(N), which is a linear increase. The plaintext
padding can simply extend the plaintext in a predefined format
(e.g. {R || M}), or use more advanced and secure schemes
like Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [20].
We choose the OAEP for plaintext padding in our scheme.
The expression of serial encryptions is abbreviated as
E
R1:Rq
KU1:KUq
[M ] = E
Rq
KUq
[E
Rq−1
KUq−1 [...[E
R1
KU1
[M ]]...]]
Besides, each IoT company Wi(0 ≤ i ≤ m) has an-
other pair of signing/verification keys (KSSi ,KV
S
i ) to sign
a message M as SIGKSSi [M ], and verify a signature sig
as V FKV Si [sig]. Similarly, each user Uj(1 ≤ j ≤ n) also
has the key pair (KSUj ,KV
U
j ) for signature generation and
verification. We define {M}SIGKS as the concatenation
(“||”) of message M and its signature (signed by key KS)
{M}SIGKS = M || SIGKS [M ]
The hash value of a message M is denoted as Hash[M ].
The permutation function p(z) randomly shuffles a group of
objects, and assigns a new position for the zth object. The
pseudorandom function PRF (L, seed) is used to generate the
most significant L bits from seed. The random numbers used
in encryptions can be generated using this function.
C. Referenced Data Aggregation
To perform an aggregate study, the collector server needs
to gather a set of data from the users of interest. For user Uj ,
the data to be submitted includes the readings of all provider
companies’ devices (provider data). We define this set of data
as the provider data set Pj = {Dij}, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The provider
data set Pj and the reading of the collector company’s device
(collector data) compose a data tuple Tj , Tj = {D0j , Pj}. The
traditional data aggregation is one-dimensional, hence users
only submit their independent pieces of data. However, the
data aggregation in the IoT is two-dimensional. Each user Uj
needs to submit the provider data set Pj , which is referenced
by the collector data D0j . Since the collector server knows D0j
for each user, it can find the owner of data tuple Tj if the D0j
is unique among all users. Hence, it should avoid collecting
from a user with unique D0j , for example, by splitting the data
range into small segments and rounding D0j values up/down
to the nearest segment.
Another characteristic in IoT data aggregation is the
provider servers. Although they are not fully reliable, our
scheme takes advantage of these provider servers to delegate
the submission of their own data. If users submit the provider
data set by themselves, they need to perform peer-shuffle on
the data in order to prevent being traced by the collector. All
such efforts can be saved if each corresponding provider server
submits the provider data for its users.
Besides, considering that the receiver may get an updated
data reading by the time the request arrives (which is not
the data intended by the requester), we need to solve the
inconsistency caused by the elapse of message transmissions.
Specifically, the data D0j is embedded in the aggregation
request sent to users, and the data Dij is embedded in the
submission request sent to provider servers.
D. The Adversary Model
1) IoT Companies and Users: All IoT companies and
users are dedicated to preserving the privacy of their own
data, meanwhile they are curious about other’s data. We
assume that all IoT companies will obey the commitment not
to disclose their user’s data without permission, so the IoT
company that deliberately reveal or trade data to other IoT
companies is not considered within the scope of this paper.
Additionally, the client devices are the source of data, and
they will always provide the true data to their owners and the
corresponding company servers. However, malicious users and
provider servers may deviate from the protocol. We consider
two basic adversarial actions: collusion and manipulation.
Collusion means that some compromised users may cooperate
with each other or with the collector/provider server to de-
anonymize the data of honest users. Manipulation allows
servers and users to insert, delete or tamper the messages
handled by them.
2) Eavesdropper: A global and passive eavesdropper may
exist, which can monitor all traffics in the network. It may
collude with an IoT server and malicious users.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we present the proposed accountable anony-
mous data aggregation scheme. The scheme works in 6 phases,
σ is the phase ID. The message transmitted in phase σ is
denoted by Ωσ . Each run of data aggregation is uniquely
identified by the session ID sid. To hold the server and user
behaviors accountable, the messages they transmit in each
phase are associated with the session ID sid and phase ID
σ, and are signed with the sender’s signing key. The receivers
will first verify the signature of the received messages before
further processing. All transmitted and received messages as
well as the random numbers used for encryptions are recorded
until the next protocol run, to serve as the evidence in case an
investigation of misbehaviors is conducted.
A. The Data Aggregation Protocol
Phase 1: Aggregation requests
The aggregation begins at the collector server S0, who
sends the aggregation requests for data Dij(1 ≤ i ≤ m) to
each user Uj . The request message contains the collector data
D0j , and it is encrypted with Uj’s public key KUUj and the
random number R0j selected by the collector server.
Ω1 = {ER0jKUUj [D0j ], sid, σ1}SIGKSS0
Phase 2: Submission of index messages
Upon receiving the aggregation request, each user Uj
prepares a pair of information: the collector data D0j and a
pseudonym number PNj (as the index number). PNj is an
L-bit random number generated using PRF (L, seedj), where
seedj is randomly selected by Uj . The probability that no
collision occurs among the selected index numbers is∏
0≤a≤n−1(2
L − a)
2Ln
L is selected to limit the collision probability under a sufficient
small threshold (e.g., 10−3). The data D0j and index number
PNj pair is defined as the index message (IM) of Uj ,
IMj = < D0j , PNj >
Then, the index message IMj is encrypted using the public
keys of all users, following a given order (e.g. sequential
order). For illustration, here we conduct the serial encryptions
in the order U1, ..., Un The encrypted index message (EIM) is
EIMj = E
R′j1:R
′
jn
KUU1 :KU
U
n
[IMj ]
where R′j1, ..., R
′
jn are the random numbers selected by Uj for
the encryptions with public keys KUU1 , ...,KU
U
n , respectively.
All encrypted index messages are sent to the first processor
for individual anonymization processing (IAP).
Ω2 = {EIMj , sid, σ2}SIGKSUj
Phase 3: Anonymization of index messages
The data anonymization is achieved via the IAPs by each
user (processor), performed in the reverse order of the serial
encryptions. Before the processors begin the IAP process, they
need to make sure that all EIMs are valid: their received
EIMs have been properly handled without being “marked”. For
these purposes, each processor carries out the replication attack
checking (Section IV-A1). In our example, the first processor
is the last encryptor Un. The received EIMs are concatenated
as an anonymization bundle message (ABM),
ABMn = EIM1 || ... || EIMn
The EIMs can be in any order (e.g., the order they arrive at
the processor). For simplicity, here we list them sequentially.
The IAP process contains two steps: shuffle and decryption.
User Un first shuffles the EIMs with its random permutation
function pn,
ABMn
shuffle−−−−−→
pn
EIMpn(1) || ... ||EIMpn(n)
Then Un decrypts all pieces of EIMs with her private key
KRUn . When the IAP finishes, the ABM becomes
ABM ′n = DKRUn [EIMpn(1)] || ... ||DKRUn [EIMpn(n)]
As all other users repeat the IAP (i.e., each shuffles the EIMs
and strips off one layer of encryption), the last processor (i.e.,
U1) will be able to recover the original index messages in a
new random order.
ABM ′1 = IMp(1) || ... || IMp(n)
where p stands for a series of permutations p1, ..., pn made by
each processor. The recovered index messages are broadcasted
to all users as well as the collector server S0. In phase 3, the
transmitted messages are the resulted ABM ′ after each IAP,
Ω3 = {ABM ′, sid, σ3}SIGKS
where KS is the signing key of the corresponding processor.
Phase 4: Peer-shuffle verification and submission requests
At the start of phase 4, all users first run the replacement
attack checking (Section IV-A2) and the broadcast consistence
checking (Section IV-A3), to verify the consistency of the
broadcasted final ABM and confirm the existence of their
own index messages. Then, the uniqueness checking (Section
IV-A4) is performed to check the existence of unique D0j
or identical index numbers among IMs. After these check-
ings are passed, each user Uj informs the provider servers
Si(1 ≤ i ≤ m) to submit the data Dij to the collector for
them. Specifically, Uj prepares a data submission message
DSMij which contains the data Dij and the index number
PNj . The index number is encrypted using the collector’s
public key KUS0 and a random number Rj . The submission
message DSMij is expressed as
DSMij =< Dij , E
Rj
KUS0
[PNj ] >
Finally, the data submission message is encrypted using the
provider server’s public key KUSi and another random number
R′j , and sent to the provider server Si,
Ω4.2 = {ER
′
j
KUSi
[DSMij ], sid, σ4.2}SIGKSUj
Phase 5: Data submission
After receiving the data submission messages from users,
provider servers will submit them to the collector altogether.
For a given provider server Si(1 ≤ i ≤ m), the data of all its
users are submitted as
Ω5 = {DSMi1||...||DSMin, sid, σ5}SIGKSSi
Phase 6: Data submission verification
The collector server receives the aggregated data tuples in
two separate parts: the first part is the < D0j , PNj > pair
(received by the end of phase 3) and the second part is the <
Dij , E
Rj
KUS0
[PNj ] > pairs. It first decrypts each E
Rj
KUS0
[PNj ]
with its private key KRS0 . Then, the original data tuple Tj
can be reconstructed by linking the < D0j , PNj > and <
PNj , Dij > pairs via the unique index number PNj . The data
submission checking (Section IV-A5) must be performed by
each user, in case the provider servers may have manipulated
the submitted data or the index number. The collector server
will finally accept the provider data if the checking is passed.
List of Checkings:
1) Replication Attack Checking: each processor scans all
EIMs, and checks if any two are duplicated or have the same
encrypted index number. With extremely low probability, the
duplication can be caused by the collision during the index
number generation when their owners select the same random
numbers for serial encryptions. This can be confirmed by
replaying the IAP processes backwards (i.e., re-encrypting
the index messages layer-by-layer with corresponding public
keys and logged random numbers), and then comparing with
the logged original EIMs. We only focus on whether the
reconstructed EIMs exist in the logged messages, while the
permutations are not replayed. If the duplication is indeed due
to the collision, the aggregation procedure will be restarted.
Otherwise, it must be a replication attack (Attack 7) launched
by compromised processor(s): the aggregation procedure is
aborted, and an investigation is launched to replay the executed
IAP processes. The detection for a replication attack has to be
conducted at each processor, otherwise the malicious proces-
sors may bypass the checking by changing the replicated EIMs
back to the original ones which are owned by themselves.
2) Replacement Attack Checking: each user scans all re-
covered index messages in the (broadcasted) final ABM, and
confirms the existence of its own index message. If it is miss-
ing, there must be malicious processor(s) who have replaced
its EIM (Attack 8). The aggregation procedure is aborted,
and the investigation to find the manipulator is launched by
replaying the IAP processes. Note that malicious processors
cannot recover the replaced legitimate EIMs of honest users
once they have been processed by an honest processor, as they
know neither the honest processor’s private key nor the random
numbers used by the honest users.
3) Broadcast Consistence Checking: all users as well as the
collector server must verify that the broadcasted final ABMs
ABMf they received are consistent. Since the broadcast is not
in a wireless channel, all receivers have to explicitly exchange
and compare the received ABMf . To make it more efficient,
they may only exchange the hash value Hash[ABMf ],
Ω4.1 = {Hash[ABMf ], sid, σ4.1}SIGKS
where KS is the signing key of the broadcast receiver. The
hash values are compared by each receiver. If any of them is
different from others, the last processor must have launched
the broadcast attack (Attack 9). The aggregation is aborted.
4) Uniqueness Checking: The uniqueness checking on
shuffled index messages consists of two parts. In the first
part, each user checks if its D0j is unique among all IMs.
If so, the collector has launched a unique collector data attack
(Attack 10). In the second part, each user checks if its index
number PNj is not unique among all IMs. If so, it can be
due to either the coincidence of index number selection, or
the manipulation made by the previous IAP processor who
has intentionally replicated an honest user’s encrypted index
number (not necessarily the data part). Since this is similar to
the replication attack checking, it can be handled in the same
way and we do not categorize it as an independent attack.
5) Data Submission Checking: each user needs to ensure
that their DSMs have been correctly submitted by the provider
servers, who may have tampered with the data Dij and/or
the encrypted index number ERj
KUS0
[PNj ] (Attack 11). This
requires the cooperation of the collector server, who will
acknowledge each submission by replying with the signed
DSM to the respective provider server Si,
Ω6.1 = {DSMij , sid, σ6.1}SIGKSS0
After all the acknowledgement messages have arrived at the
provider servers, each of them sends the signatures of the
acknowledgement messages, to the respective user who owns
the unique DSMij (i.e., the unique E
Rj
KUS0
[PNj ]),
Ω6.2 = {ERijKUUj [SIGKSS0 [DSMij ]], sid, σ6.2}SIGKSSi
Where Rij is the random number selected by the provider
server Si(0 ≤ i ≤ m) for its user Uj . Finally, each user
will verify the signature of the acknowledgement message and
the contained DSM . If failed, the user can directly warn the
collector that her data submission has been manipulated by
provider Si, so that the collector can discard the falsified data.
B. Scheme-specific Active Attacks
We present various active attacks specific to our scheme,
including the disruption attacks, data inference attacks, and
data falsification attacks.
1) Disruption Attacks: The disruption attacks abort the
protocol run by creating an abnormality that it cannot handle.
An investigation is conducted immediately when such abnor-
mality happens. Next, we list the possible disruption attacks
launched by the processors and provider servers, separately.
User (processor):
• Attack 1: the malicious user encrypts the index message us-
ing the wrong public key(s), or signs the transmitted messages
using wrong signing key.
• Attack 2: the malicious user doesn’t send its EIM, or sends
multiple EIMs to the first IAP processor.
• Attack 3: the malicious IAP processor illegally inserts or
deletes EIM(s) during its processing.
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Fig. 2. The Replication Attack
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Fig. 3. The Replacement Attack
• Attack 4: the malicious user doesn’t send its DSM, or sends
multiple DSMs to the same provider server.
Provider server:
• Attack 5: the provider server encrypts the DSM to be submit-
ted with the wrong public key or its signature is generated with
the wrong signing key. It may also happen that the provider
server tampers the signed acknowledgement message of the
collector.
• Attack 6: the provider server doesn’t submit the DSM, or
submits multiple copies of DSMs for a given user.
2) Data Inference Attacks: We present 4 types of active
data inference attacks in which the attacker(s) manipulates
the peer-shuffle process to expose the owner identity of the
index message(s). From the attacker’s perspective, to break
the strong anonymization provided by peer-shuffle, the target
EIM has to be somehow “marked” so that it can be recognized
even after it has been randomized by honest processors.
• Attack 7 (replication attack): the compromised users mark
the target EIM by replicating other honest users’ EIMs (or
only the encrypted index number part), so that the target EIM
is unique among the honest users. As illustrated in Figure 2,
the three original EIMs contain the index number 1, 2, 3,
respectively. The first processor U1 is compromised and it
wants to reveal honest user U3’s index number. It copies
the other honest user U2’s EIM2 and overwrites its own
EIM1. Now, it is easy to tell the unique EIM3 from the
duplicated EIM2 in the rest of IAP processes. In the end, the
colluding party can obtain U3’s specific index number when
EIM3 is fully decrypted. There are two prerequisites for a
replication attack: (1) the first processor must be compromised
so that the originator of the EIMs is known; (2) the number
of compromised users must be no less than 1 compared to the
number of honest users.
• Attack 8 (replacement attack): the compromised users mark
the target EIM by replacing other honest users’ EIMs with
the fake EIMs they created. The fake EIMs are different
to the target EIM and their own EIMs. In a replacement
U3
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attack, the colluding entities know exactly what the decrypted
fake EIMs look like when they go through each honest
processor. Therefore, the target EIM is the only one they do
not recognize. As illustrated in Figure 3, the compromised
processor U1 wants to know honest user U3’s index number.
During its own IAP process, U1 replaces the EIM2 of the
other honest user U2 with a fake EIM. In all the rest IAP
processes, U1 can identify not only its own EIM1, but also
the fake EIM2 it created. The only unrecognized EIM left
would be the target. Eventually, the attackers can obtain the
plaintext index number of U3. There is one prerequisite for a
replacement attack: the first processor is compromised.
• Attack 9 (broadcast attack): the last processor is supposed
to broadcast the final ABM (i.e., permuted index messages)
to all users and the collector server. However, it may infer
the index number of honest users by sending them different
(manipulated) ABMs. As illustrated in Figure 4, the last IAP
processor U3 is malicious while U1 and U2 are honest. The
permutation function p(j) calculates the permuted position
of Uj’s index message. U3 is not sure which honest user
owns which piece of the two unrecognized index messages.
Therefore it creates two manipulated ABMs, each has one of
the two unknown IMs replaced by the fake index message
IMf . This is similar to a guessing attack. If the guess is
wrong, both honest users will report that a replacement attack
is detected. Otherwise, both of them find their IMs in the
manipulated ABMs, and U3 will know the belonging of the
two index messages. The prerequisite of broadcast attack is
that the last processor is malicious.
• Attack 10 (unique collector data attack): the collector server
intentionally collects data from Uj , whose collector data D0j
is unique among all users. As a result, its data tuple Tj can
be identified by the collector server.
3) Data Falsification Attacks: The data submission mes-
sages can be manipulated by the attackers. Here, we consider
pure data falsification attacks whose only purpose is to corrupt
the aggregated data (provider data set Pj).
• Attack 11: the provider server tampers the DSMs when
submitting to the collector server.
• Attack 12: the malicious user intentionally submits the
wrong/falsified data to the collector through honest provider
servers. This attack can be detected only if the collector has
the ability to validate the aggregated data, hence its detection
is not included in the protocol as a standard step.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Correctness
When our scheme terminates, either all honest users have
correctly submitted their data to the aggregator, or the scheme
is aborted and the investigation is launched. In the first case,
all proactive checkings have been passed successfully and the
protocol has not been interrupted by any disruption attack. The
replacement attack checking verifies that the index messages
of honest users are in the final ABM. The replication at-
tack checking, broadcast consistence checking and uniqueness
checking ensure that the index messages have been correctly
received by the collector, and their ownerships are not exposed
due to replication marking, random guessing or collector data
uniqueness. The data submission checking confirms that the
data submission messages has been correctly submitted to the
collector. Hence, the collector is able to reconstruct the data
tuples by linking the index numbers. For the second case, the
protocol is aborted by a disruption attack or because one of
the checkings has failed.
B. Anonymity
Our privacy-preserving aggregation scheme is resistant to
a variety of passive data inference attacks. If the proposed
protocol is strictly followed, no entity (e.g., user, server, or the
global eavesdropper) can passively infer any data that they are
not supposed to know, either individually or collaboratively.
1) Collector server: users submit their data in two parts.
The first part (index messages) is anonymized by peer-shuffle.
The second part (data submission messages) is submitted via
delegates (i.e., provider servers) as a batch. Hence for either
of them, the collector server alone cannot trace to the owners.
2) Provider server: each provider server only has access to
its own data, and cannot obtain other servers’ data by oneself.
3) Users: a user can access each other’s data in phase 3.
However, peer-shuffle guarantees that the data of honest user
will not be exposed unless there is only one honest user.
4) Passive collusion between the IoT server and users: the
server (either collector or provider server) may collude with a
number of compromised users, to infer the data that does not
belong to the colluding entities. For collusion with the col-
lector server, our scheme is based on peer-shuffle, which can
guarantee data anonymity for honest users if there are at least
two of them. For collusion with a provider server, the index
number is encrypted with random bits in DSM to prevent the
leak of collector data D0j to the colluding party. Specifically,
colluding users know the connection between PNj and D0j
from the broadcasted IMs, while the provider server knows the
owner identity of the encrypted index numbers ERj
KUS0
[PNj ]
from the received DSMs. The random number Rj must be used
to break the equality after encryption, so that the colluding
party cannot infer the D0j value of honest users by linking
the index numbers (KUS0 is publicly available).
5) Passive collusion involving a global eavesdropper: the
passive eavesdropper is capable of monitoring the sender/re-
ceiver of all messages. In our scheme, messages are trans-
mitted in phases, with the same length and format within
each phase. So the traffic and timing analysis attack by the
eavesdropper alone is mitigated. However, if it colludes with
an entity that owns or can observe the plaintext contained
in the encrypted messages, they may work together to de-
anonymize the data or the index number in plaintext form. In
phase 1, the eavesdropper may collude with the compromised
users to infer the collector data D0j (e.g. finding if any two
are identical). In our scheme, D0j is encrypted with random
numbers selected by the collector, which breaks the equality
in ciphertexts. In phase 2 and 3, the peer-shuffle can preserve
the privacy of honest users (≥ 2) since only each honest
user themselves knows the random number used in the serial
encryptions. In phase 4, the eavesdropper may collude with
the collector server. Specifically, the eavesdropper knows the
originator Uj of the encrypted DSMs E
R′j
KUSi
[DSMij ], while
the collector server later gets DSMij from the provider Si.
Although key KUSi is publicly available, the colluding party
cannot associate the DSMij to the encrypted DSMs in Ω4.2,
as they do not know the random number R′j . Message Ω5 and
Ω6.1 are transmitted between servers, so there is no individual
user to track. The Ω6.2 messages contain only the signatures,
no data or index number can be exploited.
C. Accountability
Our scheme can preserve anonymity and provide account-
ability for the various active attacks launched by the collector,
provider, compromised users or multiple colluding entities. If
there are multiple attackers who cover for each other, at least
one of them can be found. In general, the investigation is
conducted in phases. For each phase, we only need to check
if the output is correctly computed from the input message.
While if there is an inconsistency with the message transmitted
between two entities, either the sender or the receiver is
lying. The signed message can prove if the sender is the liar;
otherwise, it is the receiver. The investigation may need to
replay the IAP process. Note that the private keys are not
required, the decryption process can be validated by replaying
the serial encryptions in reverse using the public keys and the
logged random numbers. Next, we present the detection and
investigation for the 12 active attacks listed in Section IV-B.
The disruption attacks expose themselves as they break the
current protocol run. Attacks 1 and 5 disrupt the protocol as the
receiver of a message cannot successfully decrypt the message
or when the signature cannot be verified. The failed decryption
can be caused either by faulty encryption or someone has
manipulated the message. Similarly, the wrong signature can
be caused by either the incorrect signing process or from being
tampered with. In such cases, the receiver only needs to prove
that the problematic messages are indeed coming from the
sender (i.e., signed with the sender’s signature); otherwise, the
receiver is the one to blame. If the number of EIMs in phase
3 is not consistent with the number of participating users, the
anonymization procedure will be replayed to check if it is due
to illegal insertion/deletion by a malicious processor (Attack
3), or a malicious user who does not send or send multiple
EIMs to the first processor (Attack 2). The first processor can
trace the sender of each EIM, so it knows if anyone is supposed
to submit the EIM while did not actually submit. The multiple
submission of EIMs can be proved by the multiple signed Ω2
messages from the malicious user. The missing/extra DSM can
be resulted from either a malicious provider server (Attack 6)
or a malicious user (Attack 4). The signed Ω4 messages logged
between the user and the provider server can prove which one
is responsible for the data submission error.
The data inference attacks and the data falsification at-
tacks are detected with a series of proactive checkings. The
broadcast consistence checking, the uniqueness checking and
the data submission checking, if failed, can immediately
expose the attacker, which is the last processor (attack 9), the
collector (attack 10), and a specific provider server (attack 11),
respectively. The manipulator(s) of EIMs in the replication
attack (Attack 7) and the replacement attack (Attack 8) can
be found by replaying the IAP processes. For Attack 12, the
investigation of the originator of the falsified data needs to
check the specific signed Ω4 message in which it is contained.
Note that our scheme can detect the data inference attacks
and abort the protocol before any provider data is submitted.
While for the data falsification attacks, the falsified data can
be exposed before finally accepted by the collector.
D. Complexity
In this section, we analyze the communication and com-
putational complexity of the proposed scheme. We use N to
denote the number of users and T as the number of provider
servers participated in a given data aggregation session. The
number of communication rounds, the communication over-
heads, and the computation overheads will be compared with
the prominent peer-shuffle protocol proposed in Dissent [6].
Dissent has implemented and evaluated only the “normal-
cases” of the protocol, we also focus on the efficiency of our
scheme assuming all checkings will be successfully passed.
1) Number of Communication Rounds: The server-user
communications in phases 1, 4 (Ω4.2 messages) and 6 (Ω6.2
messages) are parallelizable and require 1 round. The commu-
nications between the collector server and the provider servers
in phase 5 and phase 6 (Ω6.1 messages) can be viewed as 1
round. The submission of EIMs in phase 2 is parallelizable and
requires 1 round. Phase 3 cannot be parallelized and requires
N rounds. The exchange of hash values in phase 4 (Ω4.1
messages) is parallelizable and requires 1 round. The total
communication rounds for users is N + 5 (out of the overall
communication rounds N + 7 for the whole IoT system).
Dissent [6] considers the traditional one-server-multiple-users
architecture, and has N + 4 communication rounds for users.
2) Communication Overheads: We use X0 to denote the
unified length for all plaintexts including data, index number,
keys, etc. The serial regular public key encryption can keep the
ciphertext in fixed-length, while the encryptions with padding
will lead to a linear increase in ciphertext length. We use X
to denote the ciphertext length of regular encryptions, and
X ′k for the ciphertext length after k rounds of encryptions
with padding. The length of hash value and the signature are
H and Y , respectively. The total length of session ID and
phase ID is denoted as Z. When aggregating data from T
providers, only a subset of phases need to be repeated in our
scheme. Specifically, only message Ω4.2, Ω5, Ω6.1 and Ω6.2
are sent/received by the additional (T −1) providers. The per-
user communication overhead of our scheme is N2(2X0+H+
Y +Z) +N · (∑Nk=1X ′k + (2T + 1)X ′1 +TX ′2 +X ′N + (2T +
3)Z + (2T + 3)Y ). In contrast, the per-user communication
overhead of Dissent [6] is T · N2(2X0 + H + 2Y + 2Z) +
T · N · (∑Nk=1X ′k + 2Y + 2Z − H) − 2Y − 2Z, which is
approximately T times as much as our scheme.
3) Computation Overheads: the EncptR, decptR, Sign,
V eri, Hash and SH are computations of encryption with
padding, decryption of message encrypted with padding, sign-
ing function, verification of signature (also the session & phase
ID), hashing function, and shuffle of N objects, respectively.
When T providers are involved, the per-user computation
overhead of our scheme is (2N + 3T )EncptR+ (2N + T +
1)DecptR+(T+3)Sign+(N+2T+3)V eri+2Hash+SH+
O(N logN). By comparison, the overhead of Dissent [6] is
as large as NT ·EncptR+NT ·Encpt+NT ·DecptR+5T ·
Sign+T (N+3)·V eri+2T ·Hash+T ·SH+T ·O(N logN),
where Encpt is the computation of regular public key en-
cryption. Note that the complexity of these computations may
vary with different length of inputs. Overall, Dissent has
O(T ) times of computation overheads than our scheme. In
the single-provider case, Dissent seems to have lighter per-user
encryption overhead O(N ·Encpt+N ·EncptR+N ·DecptR)
compared to our scheme’s O(2N ·EncptR+ 2N ·DecptR).
However, the output of N rounds of Encpt is the input of
N · EncptR in Dissent, which means the computation of
N ·EncptR has to wait until N ·Encpt is done. In our scheme,
the two sets of N ·EncptR are for the collector data and index
number, which can be computed in parallel.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
We evaluate the performance of our anonymous data aggre-
gation scheme through extensive simulations. All experiments
were conducted on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 CPU 2.40GHz
laptop with 4GB memory. The RSA/ECB/NoPadding and
RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-1AndMGF1Padding cipher trans-
formations in Java cryptography library are used for regular
public key encryption and encryption with plaintext-expansion,
respectively. In our testing program, each entity ran separately,
and we counted the total execution time for a successful
data aggregation. We also tested with different user group
size, data size, and provider group size. The results presented
are the average of 20 runs, and are compared with Dissent
[6]. The public/private keys, signing/verification keys, and the
secondary public/private keys (used in Dissent) are all 1024
bits. The links between two entities are 5 Mbps with a 100
ms node-to-node latency. Note that our implementation in Java
slows down the execution of peer-shuffle compared to [6], but
our main purpose is to demonstrate the relative advantage of
our scheme over Dissent.
During implementation we found a practical issue: the
plaintext is required to be smaller than the modulus for
encryption algorithms like RSA. This can greatly impact the
serial encryptions, since the ciphertext generated by a previous
round of encryption may exceed the modulus in the next
round. When it happens, the input has to be split for separate
encryptions, which raises the computation workload and the
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Fig. 5. Performance Evaluation
length of the output ciphertext (i.e., extra cipher blocks). Dis-
sent and our scheme both perform a set of serial encryptions
with padding. Additionally, the data first go through another
set of serial encryptions without padding in Dissent. If such
issue occurs in an early stage, the resulted extra cipher blocks
will get accumulated in each of the rest serial encryption
rounds, triggering increasingly more overheads. Although it
can be observed from the theoretical analysis that the two
schemes have close overheads in single-provider case, the
total execution time in Figures 5(a), 5(c) and the per-user
communication overhead in Figures 5(b), 5(d) demonstrate
that Dissent actually has greater overheads than our scheme.
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) present the total execution time and
per-user communication overhead when different number of
users are involved. The data length is 64 Byte. The execution
time of both schemes increase with the user group size. Our
scheme is more lightweight, especially when the group size
is large. Since the serial encryptions/decryptions are the most
time-consuming computations for both schemes and a larger
user group size means more rounds of serial encryptions/de-
cryptions, the efficiency advantage of our scheme is enlarged
as the size of the user group increases. Similarly, the length of
ciphertext data after serial encryptions will also increase with
the user group size. Although different processors (users) have
different communication overheads, the average value of per-
user communication overheads grows larger with every round
of encryption that is performed.
Figures 5(c) and 5(d) present the total execution time and
per-user communication overhead with different data sizes.
The user group size is 10. As we can see, the efficiency merit
of our scheme in terms of computation and communication
overheads shrinks as the data becomes longer. This is because
the serial encryptions with padding hold the dominating part
of the overheads when the data size is large, which covers the
shortcomings of Dissent including the extra serial encryptions
without padding and the aforementioned issue that leads to
separate encryptions on plaintext.
Besides, our scheme supports the data aggregation from
multiple providers, in which the peer-shuffle process including
the serial encryptions/decryptions is conducted only once for
the index messages. In contrast, the peer-shuffle processing
is performed on both the collector data and each set of the
provider data in Dissent, which produces huge computation
and communication overheads. Figures 5(e) and 5(f) present
the performance of our scheme and Dissent when multiple
providers are involved. The user group size is 10 and the data
length is 64 Byte. While the total execution time and the per-
user communication overheads of Dissent increase with the
number of providers, it has little impact on our scheme.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the anonymous data aggregation across
multiple companies in the IoT system. This problem cannot
be solved properly by previous methods due to its special
server-users-servers architecture. We proposed an efficient and
accountable anonymous aggregation scheme, which utilizes
the semi-trusted provider servers to improve efficiency, and
provides resistance and accountability for various attacks. We
analyzed and evaluated the communication and computation
overheads of our scheme. The experimental results show that
our scheme has great efficiency in data aggregation.
REFERENCES
[1] L. Ahn, A. Bortz, and N. J. Hopper. K-anonymous message transmis-
sion. In Proc. of ACM CCS, 2003.
[2] J. Brickell and V. Shmatikov. Efficient anonymity-preserving data
collection. In Proc. of ACM KDD, 2006.
[3] D. Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital
pseudonyms. Comm. of the ACM, 24(2), Feb. 1981.
[4] D. Chaum. The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender
and recipient untraceability. Journal of Cryptology, Mar. 1988.
[5] H. Corrigan, D. Boneh, and D. Mazires. Riposte: An anonymous
messaging system handling millions of users. In Proc. of IEEE S&P,
2015.
[6] H. Corrigan and B. Ford. Dissent: Accountable anonymous group
messaging. In Proc. of ACM CCS, 2010.
[7] H. Corrigan, D. I. Wolinsky, and B. Ford. Proactively accountable
anonymous messaging in verdict. In Proc. of USENIX Security, 2013.
[8] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson. Tor: The second-
generation onion router. In Proc. of USENIX Security, 2004.
[9] X. Du, M. Guizani, Y. Xiao, and H. H. Chen. A routing-driven elliptic
curve cryptography based key management scheme for heterogeneous
sensor networks. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications,
8(3):1223–1229, March 2009.
[10] X. Du and H. h. Chen. Security in wireless sensor networks. IEEE
Wireless Communications, 15(4):60–66, Aug 2008.
[11] X. Du, Y. Xiao, M. Guizani, and H.-H. Chen. An effective key
management scheme for heterogeneous sensor networks. Ad Hoc
Networks, 5(1):24–34, 2007.
[12] X. Du, M. Zhang, K. Nygard, S. Guizani, and H.-H. Chen. Self-
healing sensor networks with distributed decision making. International
Journal of Sensor Networks, 2(5-6):289–298, 2007.
[13] T. El Gamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based
on discrete logarithms. In Proc. of CRYPTO, pages 10–18, 1985.
[14] S. Goel, M. Robson, M. Polte, and E. G. Sirer. Herbivore: A Scalable
and Efficient Protocol for Anonymous Communication. Technical
report, Cornell University, February 2003.
[15] Z. Guan, J. Li, L. Wu, Y. Zhang, J. Wu, and X. Du. Achieving efficient
and secure data acquisition for cloud-supported internet of things in
smart grid. IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 4(6):1934–1944, Dec
2017.
[16] Z. Guan, G. Si, X. Zhang, L. Wu, N. Guizani, X. Du, and Y. Ma.
Privacy-preserving and efficient aggregation based on blockchain for
power grid communications in smart communities. IEEE Communica-
tions Magazine, 56(7):1–7, Jul 2018.
[17] X. Hei and X. Du. Biometric-based two-level secure access control
for implantable medical devices during emergencies. In Proceeding of
IEEE INFOCOM, April 2011.
[18] S. Liang and X. Du. Permission-combination-based scheme for android
mobile malware detection. In 2014 IEEE International Conference on
Communications (ICC), pages 2301–2306, June 2014.
[19] S. B. Mokhtar, G. Berthou, A. Diarra, V. Quma, and A. Shoker. Rac:
A freerider-resilient, scalable, anonymous communication protocol. In
Proc. of IEEE ICDCS, July 2013.
[20] Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding.
[21] M. G. Reed, P. F. Syverson, and D. M. Goldschlag. Anonymous
connections and onion routing. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications, May 1998.
[22] M. K. Reiter and A. D. Rubin. Crowds: Anonymity for web transac-
tions. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC),
Nov 1998.
[23] D. Wolinsky, H. Corrigan, B. Ford, and A. Johnson. Dissent in numbers:
Making strong anonymity scale. In Proc. of USENIX OSDI, 2012.
[24] L. Wu, X. Du, and X. Fu. Security threats to mobile multimedia applica-
tions: Camera-based attacks on mobile phones. IEEE Communications
Magazine, 52(3):80–87, March 2014.
[25] Y. Xiao, V. K. Rayi, B. Sun, X. Du, F. Hu, and M. Galloway. A survey
of key management schemes in wireless sensor networks. Computer
Communications, 30(11):2314 – 2341, 2007. Special issue on security
on wireless ad hoc and sensor networks.
[26] Y. Yao, L. T. Yang, and N. N. Xiong. Anonymity-based privacy-
preserving data reporting for participatory sensing. IEEE Internet of
Things Journal, Oct 2015.
[27] X. Zhao, L. Li, G. Xue, and G. Silva. Efficient anonymous message
submission. In Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM, March 2012.
